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HUMANITY AND CREATUREHOOD
In Tragic Wisdom and Beyond, published toward the end of
his life, Gabriel Marcel ends his discussion of authentie humanism
with a striking remark: "At the present moment," he says, "for a
philosopher who is conseious of his responsibilities ...there is
probably no more pressing task than finding fundamental existential
assurances which are constitutive of being truly human in the image of
God."1
The language here is somewhat different from what he
normally employs, but there is no mistaking its seriousness. Lived
atheism, he insists, ean only open the way to "despair" and be a "path
to death. 1I While more fervent and overtly "religious" than his
customary style, the passage nevertheless enunciates a view to
which he had long been committed: human existence, to be fully
authentie, must be open to God, and philosophical thought, to be
fully authentie, must bear witness to this openness.
It would not be difficult to find repeated instanees of this
position throughout his writings. In the last few pages of his
remarkable essay on "The Mystery of the Family" in Homo Viator, he
says that IIln the last analysis it is on this elementary yet generally
misunderstood notion of the state of a creature, the condition of a
creature, that we must place the decisive accent." 2 In the concluding
chapter of The Mystery of Being he stresses the I'fundamental fact
that our condition is that of creatures, who can never cease to be
such, and who are compelled to think of ourselves only in this
perspective.1I3 And in Men Against Humanity he warns against the
dangerous consequences which await "so soon as man denies to
1Tragic Wisdom and Beyond, tr. Stephen Jolin and Peter McCormick,
(Evanston, 111., Northwestem Univ. Press, 1973), p. 44.
2Homo Viato" tr. Emma Crauford, (Chicago, Henry Regnery 1951), p.
95.
3The Mystery of Being, vol. 11, tri Rene Hague, (Chicago, Henry
Regnery, 1951), pp. 172/3. .
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himself that he is a created being.1I4
It would be wrong to regard such statements as mere
concessions to the language of conventional piety or as tapses into
sentimentalism. On the contrary, they are distillations of the issue
upon which philosophy turns. The question of whether or not the
human self can be understood apart from a relation to a transcendent
is not just one among others, which might be of interest to certain
groups of thinkers. If philosophy is the prosecution of the human
search for self-understanding, it is idle to pretend that this central
question does not pervade every aspect of the search. Certainly not
all of what has passed for philosophy in the twentieth century has feit
it incumbent upon itself to address or even to pay attention to this
question; many philosophers have either wanted to get on with other
business or have declared the question out of court as a pleader with
no standing. But this has not rendered either their thought or their
lives immune from the consequences of their own refusal. Marcel
even saw a connection between the Nietzschean proclamation "God
is deadl" and the spreading fear in the practical order that man is in his
death throes.5 The fear to which he alludes was no doubt generated
in large part by the dread feit over the standing threat of mutual
annihilation which seemed to hang over the human race in the
shadow of the nuclear bomb and the cold war. But in our time a
connection could also be drawn between the subjectivizing of the
issues of God and morality and the cultural disintegration which it is no
longer possible to deny as threatening the stability of western society
- a disintegration which was already in the forefront of Marcel's
concern.
Vet from another standpoint the reader of Marcel might be a
little puzzled by his use of the term "creaturehood" to convey his view
of the matter. First, it seems more unabashedly "religious" than his
ordinary way of speaking and might be taken to give religious belief a
determinative role in philosophy. While Marcel is undeniably a
4Men Against Humanity, tr. G. S. Fraser, (Lenden, The Harvill Press,




religious thinker, he usually seeks to playa mediating role and to take
his stand on experiential grounds which are accessible to the non-
believer. Is he being inconsistent here? Secondly, he expresses
opinions at some places in his work which might seem to be at
variance with the resort to the term IIcreature.1I For reasons of
exposition, it would be useful to begin with an examination of the
second point, since it may weil shed light on the first.
Anyone who speaks about man as a "creaturell is naturally
thought to be using a term that is correlative to the conception of God
as a IIcreator." Marcel himself is often enough willing to do so. The
trouble is that the latter is a metaphysical notion which carries the
freight of the category of cause, and Marcel has told us in a few places
that he does not find this category to be particularly helpful in
elucidating the ontological meaning of human experience. In his reply
to Hartshorneis paper in the SchUpp volume he specifically extends
his hesitation to the theological use of the term, and even resists
Hartshorne's employment of the term lIagentll as applied to God. 6 Vet
surely those in the philosophical tradition who have spoken of God as
a creator have assumed this to mean that God is the First Cause who
brought the world into being out of nothing and that human existence
is one of the things which this divine action has caused. Isn1t it
awkward to avail oneself of the category of IIcreaturell while cavilling at
the category of IIcausell? Perhaps 'the right answer is that it is indeed
aWkward, but that it is not the sort of awkwardness that Marcel's
elusive metaphysics would chafe uhder excessively. Admittedly, the
notion of cause he found dubious seems to have been the
empiricistls notion of an antecedent invariably connected with a
consequent, a notion which found whatever valid application it had in
the Marcellian realm of "objects,1I and was unilluminating in respect to
human life. His response to the difficulty was not to seek a more
acceptable metaphysical explication of causation, but to approach
human existence without reliance on the category.
But if one does not get at the appreciation of creaturehood
through a metaphysics of causation, what access to this idea is left? A
6 In The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcei, ad. Paul Arthur Schilpp and
Lewis Edwin Hahn, (La Salle, 111., Open Court, 1984), pp. 368/9. (A volume in
Library of Living Philosophers series)
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start at appreciating this might be made if we think of the famous
passage in the Phaedo where Socrates renounces any recourse to
suieide as morally reprehensible. The grounds upon which he does
so are simple and straightforward. Man does not have dominion over
his own being and may not dispose of it as he sees fit. We do not
belong to ourselves: we belong to the gods and must await their will in
the disposition of our lives. Now Socrates never attained the
metaphysical eonception of creation ex nihilo, but in these utterances
he undoubtedly eame very elose to what Marcel seems to regard as
the eentral significance in the notion of ereation: 'the fact that manls
being is not autonomous, that he exists only through partieipation in
an order of reality whieh surpasses hirn, and that this partieipation is
spontaneausly experienced as a gift.
This will help to answer the first question: does Marcells
emphasis on ereaturehood make philosophy dependent on religious
belief and therefore eompromise its status as thought? Our reply
should first reeord that Mareel would not be inclined to aeeept any
obligation to preserve the status of something called "philosophy"
hermetieally sealed off from the religious dimension. In his eyes
concrete philosophy is arefleetion upon integral human experience in
an effort to reeuperate and express its profoundest intelligibility. It
cannot begin with the a prior; decision to exelude a religious
dimension, or it would betray the task of recognition which is its
mission. It begins with human life as it finds it concretely. The
conviction of the ereaturely eharacter of that life is not an importation
from a souree alien to experience, but a descriptive interpretation of
what refleetion discovers in experience itself.
It seems important to note that, while "ereaturehoodll is an
interpretive eoneept, it is an interpretation precisely of human
experienee. In this approach, to eomprehend manls existenee as
creaturely is not to subsurne it under a more universal eategory
derived fram elsewhere, but to aehieve an insight into human
existence as such. It would, after all, be a matter of small moment and
small interest in our study of the behavior of non-human entities to
advert to the fact that they are IIcreaturesH: our investigation of
chemical elements, for example, would proceed on the same lines
whatever our view on their ereaturely status. But this is not true in the
ease of man. "Being a ereature" affeets the way human beings are; it
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is in the comprehension of their specifically human aspects that the
concept of creaturehood is required. This could even be put
hypothetically: ifit is the case that man is a creature in Marcells sense,
then this will affect and be traceable in every aspect of his specifically
human existence. The life of reason, intersubjectivity, moral
experience, and public and historical existence would all give
evidence of this crea'tureliness. Therefore a philosophical thought
that genuinely recuperated human existence would have to
recuperate it precisely as creaturely. That is one way of expressing
the philosophical import of the traditional theological formula that man
is the lIimage of GOd. '1
In the passages which have been quoted, Marcel's thought
has arrived at the stage where the condition of creaturehood has
become evident and where it can shed an independent light on the
experiences upon which he reflects. But it was uncovered originally
in the experiences themselves. Which experiences are these? They
are the very ones about which his thought perpetually gravitates, the
primary .experiences of incarnation and communion in which the
character of the self as a being-by-participation is manifested. The self
which thus comes to light is not an autonomous ego, but an existent
whose presence for itself is made possible by the participation within
which it arises. The seil as participant existent is not the foundation
for its own being: it does not confer the content of its participation
upon itself.
Fundamental among these participations is the experience of
embodied presence to the world which Marcel caUs lIincarnation. 1I His
absorption with the theme of incarnation was initially aroused by his
efforts to overcome the epistemological difficulties of Cartesian
subjectivism. But it is easy to overlook that his aphorism 111 am my
bodyll presupposes that the experience of incarnation is the
experience of an 111 11 : it is not simply a formula for embodiment, but the
epitomizing of an embodied selfhood. IIHere I am, what luck!1I is the
way that Marcel conveys the lIexclamatory awarenessll of existence
which emerges in incarnation. 7 There is no way in which a self in this
moment of astonishment can regard itself as the author of its own
being - its natural tendency is to assume that it is the beneficiary of an
7The Mystery 0' Being, val. I, pp. 90/1.
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inexplicable gift.
Incarnation is the first level in the progressive cognizance of
the gift character in my self..conscious existence. 8 This character is
confirmed and enlarged at the level of communion, since the
presence of the thou is not something which it is within my power to
confer upon myself: it is a free bestowal which founds my own being
in a new mode of self-presence. In its ultimate depth, the orientation
to the co-presence of the other which characterizes all self-presence
is revealed through the exigence for the fullness of presence which
Marcel caUs "being. 11 This exigence cannot be regarded as a mere
accidental supplement to a self whose essential significance can be
comprehended apart from it. Rather, the ontological exigence is also
a form of participation. As such it is the foundation for a new and
unique level of intelligible self-presence. Nor is there any way in
which some other department of the self can claim to assess the
validity of the exigence for plenitude, for this exigence establishes
the self in arealm transcendent to the abstract order where the notion
of IIvalidityll has its proper application.9
Paradoxically, this exigence is a participation precisely insofar
as it is a need, and this provides a strong warrant for caUing Marcells
thought in the last analysis "Augustinian." For at the deepest level of
concreteness in the human existent, the self is experienced as a
yearning, a lack which is oriented towards a fullness. Obviously he
does not intend this to be a credal pronouncement; it is a
phenomenological uncovering of a truth about human existence as
such and thus still occupies common ground with the reflective non-
believer.
To generalize: whatever is specifically human about me -
whatever is grasped as comprising my uniquely human way of being-
in-the-world - turns out to be a participation in what is beyond me. In
this light it is easy to understand the monumental discovery of
Socrates and Plato as a step on the road to the recognition of
creaturehood. Reason as such, they saw, is not something individual
and isolated, but a participation in ... a participation in an order of
8 The Mystery of Being. vol. 11. p. 173.
90n the ontologieal exigence. see The Mystery of Being. vol. 11. eh. 3.
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intelligibility which has precedence over the individual. The individual
is actually constituted as rational by the participation in this
transcendent order. For even as reasoner, I am not autonomous: I do
not belong to myself. To say"l am rational" is ipsa fsetato say that my
thinking is a participation in a ~'common.1I A private reason, as
Heraclitus saw, is a nonsense. And for the benefit of moderns and
post-moderns, one might add that a collective private reason is in no
better case, so that a "consensus" theory of truth is also a nonsense.
The historical process of self-understanding which this
discovery originated blended with the influence of Christian faith and
metaphysics to form a public and political reality which has carried with
it an articulated conception of the God who answers to human
longing. Intersubjectivity has borne its testimony to the being which
answers to the obscure exigence which arises within the human
subject, and the actual course of history has been shaped by this
intersubjective self-understanding. This is a fact of central
importance, since, as Marcel says, -man depends, to a very great
degree, on the idea he has of hirnself ..."10
Now the affirmation of my creaturehood is not accomplished
by an abstract thought or by a neutral spectator reason. Its vehicle is
the fully concrete human life which is at the same time the target of the
affirmation. Hence whatever distorts or degrades this life in the
conerete makes the affirmation of transcendence impossible or
difficult; conversely, whatever makes this affirmation impossible
degrades the concrete life of man. Much of Marcel's soeial thought is
;'nspired by his contemplation of the human impoverishment whieh
has ensued upon the lass of the social sense of creaturehood, a loss
which seemed to justify the fear that the very idea of man is
"decomposing before our eyes."11
Far from being the insult to my freedom and dignity which
seeular humanists have deelared it to be, the affirmation of my
creaturehood looks like the sole basis upon whieh this dignity can be
preserved. Consider the· alternative to the aeknowledgement of
10Men Against Humanity, p. 14.
11Ibid., p. 134.
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creaturehood. In my deniall will either be tempted to claim complete
independence for the ego, or I will be tempted to understand it as a
product of natural processes, a negligible epiphenomenon whose
signiticance an adequately developed science could discountenance
altogether. I will, as it were, either deify the seit or nullify it, and ·so lose
contact with my proper humanity.
In point of fact the two alternatives tend to have similar
consequences in practice. For whether lexalt the ego or debase it in
theory, my empirical ego must in practice live out its life without
reference to any imperium beyond itself. As Marcel says, the more
man treats himself as the result of purely natural causes,
the more he arrogates to himself the right of absolute
sovereignty in all that concerns the ordering of his personal
conduct. The more he is theoretically humiliated by a
materialist philosophy which claims to deny any special
identity in himself or his actions, the more does he actually
develop a practical pride which impels him to deny the
existence of any human order to which he might owe
obedience.12
Such an ego appears to lack all focus except its succession of
desires and fears, and at best will regard itself as a center of power for
the effectuation of motives based upon them. Inevitably it will be
drawn into systematic conflict with other egos understood as
competing centers of power. In the political order it will be capable of
forming alliances with like-minded others, but it can rise to no higher
conception of the political order than as an arrangement which permits
maximum satisfaction to competing centers of power. To such a pass
our modern democratic liberal state now seems to have come.
It is by no means certain, however, that a political order resting
on such an idea of man is on a very secure basis. It may weil be living
on the capital of the past. We have grown accustomed in our day to
hear that democracy upholds the "rights of the person, 11 and the
assertion of such rights has expanded hyperbolically in recent years.
But the idea of person is certainly historically connected with the
acknowledgement of creaturehood, and it highly questionable that it
12Homo Viatol; p. 95.
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is viable apart from it. Marcel was of the opinion over forty years ago
that the idea of person is today without roots, that it is a survival. We
ought to admit, he says, that if the idea of person is still capable of
generating any respect, "it is only to the degree in which the notion
profits from the aura which surrounds the notion of a creature formed
in the image of his Creator." 13 As currently used, it is at risk of being
just a weapon in the game of power played among egos which
recognize only their own desires as normative in their behavior.
At the time of his major writings Marcel had before his eyes
the examples of the two totalitarianisms to demonstrate what havoc
could be wreaked on flesh-and-blood human beings by a public
power with a false idea of man. These evils may now be behind us,
but the social and cultural despoliation which Marcel portrayed in
western society is surely deeper and more widespread than what he
had to contemplate, and it too occurs because a public sphere
imposes a false idea of man upon private lives. Marcel only had cause
to deplore the "abominable propaganda" 14 which promoted abortion,
while we in our own day witness the full actuality of a government-
sponsored slaughter carried on in the name of human rights. But
could this and other outrages ever have come to pass except against
the background of a relentless desacralization of human life brought
about by the public powers which shape our daily existence? It
cannot be without consequence that from earliest infancy the
communication and entertainment industries overwhelm the human
psyche with an indiscriminate succession of images, a succession to
which of late years the freakish and depraved contribute an
increasingly generous share. Sy displaying the equality of all desires,
they convey the meaninglessness of all. And can they be wrong?
Are they not backed by the authority of an educational establishment
which teaches the relativism of value and truth, and indeed, at its
upper and more" fashionable levels, even proposes the malleability of
the language text in which it teaches this? In such an atmosphere,
even the "liberty" upon which the West plumes itself becomes a
doubtful adornment: for if we are worthless, what does it matter that
13Men Against Humanity, p. 174.
14Homo Viator, p. 89.
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we are free?15
It is as if much of modern life has conspired to adduce a kind
of forgetfulness of their own humanity in the minds of those who
breathe its air. When they do think about it, Marcel remarks that there
is a danger that the materialist outlook which is presumed to account
for our "progress" has been adopted by the man in the street to such
an extent that it has erected a wall between his own best experience
of life and his thought about it. 16 Marcel's philosophy wants to breach
that wall. It is his aim to bring us back to the experiences in which our
creaturely existence, in all its unique misery and grandeur, is brought
to recognition. His reflections on fidelity, hope, and love, his
explorations of incarnation, value, freedorn, death, testimony, his
entire dramatic work, his social reflections, such as the essay on the
family which now seems so prescient, have no other goal.
Marcel's dedicated and successful pursuit of this goal over
five decades and in a truly inimitable manner was an extraordinary
achievement. The task he set himself was not easy and it has becorne
harder in our time. For we think with what we are, and to the extent
that the daily social scene in which we all live out our existence
exhibits the spectacle of desecration, the resources to affirm the true
character of human life are weakened and depleted. Under these
circumstances, we can understand why Marcel says that the
philosopher's task will always be that of "recollection": to caU us back
to that sacred center where our creaturehood remains inviolate, and
where, by opening ourselves to a presence immeasurably beyond us,
we are open to all our fellow-creatures.
Fordham University KENNETH T. GALLAGHER
15Marcel's belief that the meaning 01 freedom could only be seen in
relation to a transcendent order (Men Against Humanity, p. 184) has an
interesting, rather Thomistic counterpart in John Paul 11 15 recent encyclical
Veritatis Splendor.
16Tragic Wisdom and Beyond, p. 108.
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